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1 Introduction
Recycling is actively promoted around the world in response to the
rising international prices of raw materials and concerns over the sustain-
ability of an environment. Through recycling, wastes are recycled into
what we call recyclable materials. Recyclable materials are produced from
either used products or byproducts (waste) generated in the production
processes, and consequently being used as intermediate goods or substi-
tutes for virgin raw materials. In a globalized world, these recycling proc-
esses are not necessarily completed domestically. Recyclable materials
such as metal scraps, wood scraps, used papers and waste plastics are
traded in the international market and their volume is increasing rapidly.１）
Trade in recyclable materials raised at least two skeptical views on
free trade. One concerns with the environmental effects of processing
wastes claiming that trade in recyclable materials may lead to pollution
dumping. In fact, in the 1980’s, there were such cases that some of the
exports of recyclable materials from the developed countries to the
developing countries contained hazardous wastes. It resulted in Basel
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Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal (so called the Basel Convention) that prohibits in-
ternational movements of unrecoverable wastes and hazardous recyclable
wastes. Recyclable materials traded under Basel Convention, in theory, no
longer contain hazardous wastes that cause serious environmental damage
and thus can be considered as resources.
Another concern arises from the belief that recycling processes should
be completed domestically. Japanese recycling laws, for example, explic-
itly encourage domestic recycling and aim at building a closed recycling
system. Increasing trade in recyclable materials are believed to be jeop-
ardizing the domestic recycling sector by taking necessary inputs of
recyclable materials away. In order to protect the domestic recycling
system, trade in recyclable materials is discouraged through non-tariff
measures.
Despite the facts that trade in recyclable materials is increasing and
there are growing concerns over them, there has been little formal eco-
nomic analysis addressing the issues of trade in recyclable materials. This
paper attempts to make a small step forward in understanding the welfare
effects of trade in recyclable materials. Recyclable materials are used as
intermediate goods or raw materials but are distinct in the sense that they
are recycled from wastes. We try to provide some insights on whether
trade in recyclable materials should be considered differently from trade in
virgin materials, or to put it differently, whether there are gains from trade
in recyclable materials. One of the main findings of this paper is that the
existence of the gains from trade in recyclable materials depends on how
wastes are generated.
Waste generation can be classified into two types. One is consump-
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tion wastes which are used products discarded after use. The other type of
waste is generated through production processes as byproducts.
In the Japanese recycling system, the byproducts from certain produc-
tion processes are classified as industrial wastes２）and others as solid mu-
nicipal wastes, and they are recycled in the separate processing systems.
Industrial wastes are treated by the private recycling sector, while munici-
pal solid wastes are treated by the municipal governments themselves or
by the designated recyclers.
Classifying industrial wastes from other wastes was primarily in-
tended to alleviate the government’s burden of landfill costs. Facing the
rapid increase in wastes, the government made explicit that business sec-
tors are responsible for treatment of their own wastes. Law for Promotion
of Effective Utilization of Resources was enacted in 2001 to promote
reduction of waste, reuse of parts, and recycling of used products as raw
materials. The law requires industries such as pulp and paper, chemical
manufacturing, iron, steel, copper, and automobile manufacturing to re-
duce generation of byproducts by economizing the use of raw materials
and promoting the use of byproducts as recyclable resources and it also
instituted a penalty clause.
Although industrial wastes and consumption wastes are treated sepa-
rately in the Japanese domestic recycling processes, trade policies on
２） 20 kinds of waste materials discharged from business activities, such as burnt
residue, sludge, animal excrement discharged in the livestock industry, oil
waste, acid waste, alkali waste, animal bodies discharged in the livestock indus-
try, are defined as industrial wastes. The distinction between industrial wastes
and municipal solid wastes does not necessarily coincide with the commodity
classification. Paper scraps are industrial wastes if they are byproducts from the
production process in the paper mills, but they are treated as municipal wastes
if papers are discarded as office wastes. See METI (2011) for details.
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recyclable materials do not distinguish the two. However, as we will see
in this paper, the two types of wastes will have different welfare effects of
trade.
In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of opening trade in re-
cyclable materials being formalized as intermediate goods made from in-
dustrial wastes. We go beyond the case for industrial waste and compare
the result with gains from trade in recyclable materials which are made
from consumption wastes (used products). Using a simple open economy
model, we are able to identify that it is the recycling effects of trade that
matters in determining the welfare effects of trade in recyclable materials.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, trade in recy-
clable materials made from industrial wastes are formalized in a simple
general equilibrium trade model. The equilibrium of the model is going to
be shown by using the diagrams. In Section 3, we proceed to examine the
welfare effects of trade in the final good and the recyclable material in
turn, and finally compare the result with the recyclable material made
from consumption wastes. The paper is concluded with some remarks in
section 4.
2 A Model
The economy consists of two sectors producing a recyclable material,
R , and a final product F . Production of the final good uses R and labor
as inputs according to the production function
XF  FF (LF RF ) (1)
where LF and RF are the inputs of labor and a recyclable material used in
the production of the final good. FF is assumed to exhibit constant returns
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to scale and diminishing returns to each factor.
The production function for the recyclable material is
R  FR (LR ZR ) (2)
where LR denotes labor and ZR is an amount of industrial waste processed
to produce of recyclable material. FR is also assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns to labor and industrial wastes.
Through the production of the final good, industrial wastes ZF are
generated, which are to be used as inputs in the production of the final
good.
ZF  XF (3)
where is the recycling rate; 01.３）
Material balance equations of the model are as follows.
LF LR    (4)
RF RE  R (5)
ZF  ZR (6)
where  is the amount of labor supply and RE is the export of the recy-
clable material.
Assuming producers act competitively, the marginal productivity
pricing conditions hold. Hence, we have PF FFLF  PR FRLR (7)
３） Non-recycled wastes are assumed to be disposed of at no cost. Environmental
costs associated with non-recycled wastes are not considered in this paper.
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PR  PF  FF RF (8)
PZ  PR  FR ZR (9)
where Pi is the international price of commodity i. Since the economy is
assumed to be a small open economy, PF and PR are determined exoge-
nously. The price of the recycling industrial wastes PZ can be thought of
as a factor reward earned by the ‘factor owner’ of industrial wastes, i.e.,
producers.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium labor allocation. The distance
OO indicates , with LF measured from the origin O and LR from O .
The curve FR () depicts the production function of R at a given level of
ZR
0
. The vertical axis measures the output R . The outputs of the final
good F is indicated by isoquants from the origin O.
In the absence of foreign trade, RE  0，point E in Figure 1，at which
the isoquant XF and FR are tangent, is the equilibrium. Point E deter-




mines the equilibrium allocation of labor, LF and LR as well as the output
R that attains the maximum output XF . In equilibrium, as (7) and (8)
indicate, the marginal product of labor in the recyclable material sector,
indicated by the slope of FR , is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and the recyclable material in the final good sector which is
given by the slope of XF at E ; 
PR
FRLR FRLFFFRF
In a competitive equilibrium, the unit-cost equations can be written as
aFL aFR PR PF (10)
aRL aRZ PZ PR (11)
where aij is the input requirement of factor j for the production of com-
modity i. It should be noted that the international prices of the final good
and the recyclable material, PF and PR , solely determine the wage  and
the price of recycling wastes PZ .４）
As PR increases, (10) indicates that  decreases to offset the change
in PR . With a decrease in  , (11) implies that an increase in PR leads to




to (PFPR )1 , will lead to a decrease in
 
PZ
from (  PZ )0 to (  PZ )1 in Figure 2.
There is a positive relationship between  PZ and −PFPR , as shown in Figure 2.
４） In case of consumption wastes, it is assumed that consumers own wastes and
earn factor rewards PZ in the recycling sector. Once disposed, consumption
wastes are owned by the contracted collectors who earn revenue by selling
recycling garbage to the recycling sector. The price of wastes took negative
values in such market as used papers and used plastic bottles. See Satake et al
(2010) for detailed description of the recycling system for used plastic bottles
in Japan.
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The response of factor prices can be verified by totally differentiating
the above equations. FL ０ ˆ PˆF   FR PˆR       (12) RL  RZ PˆZ PˆR
The hat notation indicates the rate of change in that variable such thatˆd, and  ij is the factor payment share of j in commodity i.
Solutions of the price system give us the following.ˆ 1 FL (PˆF   FR PˆR ) (13)
PˆZ  1 FL RZ (  RL PˆF  RL FR PˆR  FL PˆR ) (14)
An increase in the international price of the recyclable material decreaseswhile increases PZ .
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale technology, factor
prices are determined independent of the size of  or the output levels of
Figure 2: Output Prices and Factor Prices
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XF and R , and solely by the international prices of PF and PR . Factor
prices, then, determine input requirements aij as well as the slope of O E ,
which is equal to aFR
aFL
, in Figure 1.
We can now extend the analysis to the trading equilibrium where
RE  0. For each XF0, the marginal productivity pricing implies the slopes
of FR and the isoquant XF0 be equal to ( PR )0 as shown in Figure 3. XF0 and
FR are no longer tangent to one another. The equilibrium export level, RE0,
is determined so as to maximize the vertical distance between tangency
points on FR and the isoquant XF0.
The recycling sector equilibrium is shown in Figure 4. Once the final
output is determined, the diagram in the second quadrant indicates how
much wastes are generated in the economy, i.e., ZR0. In the first quadrant,
the isoquants for the recyclable materials are drawn. The input require-
ments in the recycling sector are uniquely determined so as to equate PZ
and the marginal rate of substitution between LR and ZR along the unit
isoquant for R . The output level R 0 is the maximum output of R that is
Figure 3: Trading Equilibrium
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attainable given the amount of ZR0 and LR0 which are already determined in
Figure 3.
By further examining the resource constraints, we can confirm the
trade-off relationship between the final good output and the export of the
recyclable material. The trade-off relationship can be illustrated by the
“production possibility frontier” in Figure 5.
The resource constraints for labor and the recyclable material are
given as follows:
aFL XF  aRL R   (15)
aFR XF RF (16)
aRZ R ZR  XF (17)
By substituting (13) and (14) and totally differentiating,
Figure 4: Recycling Sector
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       (18)
 iL is labor employment share in commodity i,  ER  RER is the share of
exports in recyclable material, and i is the elasticity of factor substitution
in sector i; F  aˆ FLaˆ FRˆPˆ R , R  aˆ RLaˆ RZˆPˆ Z .
The solution of the system yields;    1 ER      (19)
where by using (13) and (14),
B1   FLFRFL F  FR 1FLR
B2   FRF
B3   RLFLRZR
It is straightforward to obtain the trade-off relationship;
Xˆ F Rˆ E   1 ER (B2 B3 )(Pˆ F Pˆ R ) (20)
The term Xˆ FRˆ E
Pˆ FPˆ R indicates that the “production possibility frontier” between
the final good and the exports of recyclable material is concave around
the equilibrium; the final good to the recyclable material export ratio
 FL FR
1
 RL11 ０ ER０ XˆFRˆRˆE   FL




 ER 0 ER 0 ER 1  RL ER FL ER FL  RL FR  B1 (Pˆ F Pˆ R )B2 (Pˆ F Pˆ R )B3 (Pˆ F Pˆ R )ˆ
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increases as the relative price of the final good increases. Conversely, as
the relative price of recyclable materials increases, the exports of recycla-
ble materials increase relatively more than the increase in the production
of the final good.
The “production possibility frontier” in Figure 5 indicates the maxi-
mum amount of RE attainable for a given level of XF . When the final
good output is equal to X˜ F , RE is zero; X˜ F indicates the autarky equilib-
rium output. R˜ 0 is the output level of R when the entire labor force is
employed in the recycling sector with a given level of ZR . If the recycla-
ble material is being imported, RE is negative, and the “production possi-
bility frontier” will cross through the horizontal axis. Point A in Figure 5,
at which the slope of the production possibility frontier is equal to (PFPR)
0
,
indicates the equilibrium combination of XF0 and RE0. The consumption of
the final good CF0 at (PFPR)
0 is given by the intercept of the budget line aa
on the horizontal axis. The distance between CF0 and XF0 indicates the
Figure 5: Trade Triangle with Recyclable Material Exports
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amount of imports of the final good.
We have now completed the description of the model. As we proceed
to analyze the welfare effects of trade, the direction of the changes in the
final good output with respect to the changes in international prices plays
an important role. Before we move on, we thus present the comparative
static result on XF obtained in (19).
Xˆ F   1 ER (B1  RL B3 )(Pˆ F Pˆ R ) (21)
Clearly, the term (B1  RL B3 ) is positive. An increase in PF , or
alternatively a reduction in PR , will increase XF . It should also be noted
that ZR is positively correlated with XF for wastes are generated by the
production of the final good.
3 Gains from Trade
The final good F is the only consumption good in the economy and it is
assumed to be imported from the rest of the world in exchange for RE . As
we have seen in Figure 5, the amount CF0 of the final consumption good
is imported in exchange for RE0 that satisfies the following trade balance
equation:
PF CF  PF XF PR RE (22)
A country is considered to gain from international trade if the con-
sumption bundle under the free trade equilibrium costs at least as much to
purchase as does the bundle under the autarky equilibrium. The consump-
tion bundle is simply the amount of good F in our model. The welfare
effects of trade is to be analyzed by using the minimum expenditure func-
tion, g (PFu ; PR ).
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g (PF u ; PR ) PF XF PR RE (23) PF FF (LF FR (LR ZR )RE )PR RE
The minimum expenditure function is assumed to be i) positively homo-
geneous of degree one in PF , ii) concave in PF , and iii) gPF  CF .
In the following subsections, we examine gains from trade in both the
consumption goods and the recyclable materials.
3.1 Gains from Trade in Consumption Goods
The welfare effects of trade is to be analyzed by looking at the changes in
the international price of the final consumption good. By differentiating




 gPF PF dXFdPF PR dREdPF  (XF CF )PZ dZRdPF (24)
The expression for the welfare effects of trade is decomposed to two
components; the terms of trade effect, shown by the first term, and the re-
cycling effect represented by the second term in (24). As the terms of
trade improves, i.e., a fall in PF , the welfare improves by the amount
proportional to the volume of imports. Since the supply response of the
final good to the changes in its own price is positive, we know the recy-
cling effect is positive Zˆ R
Pˆ F
 B1 RL B3 0. The terms of trade im-
provement through a lower PF reduces the production of the final good,
and hence reduces the waste generation. If the final good is imported, the
reduction in PF increases welfare.５）
５） If the final good is an export, g0 dud PF 0; an increase in PF increases welfare.
Thus, there always exist gains from trade in final consumption goods, irrespec-
tive of their trade patterns.
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3.2 Gains from Trade in Recyclable Materials
We can analogously examine the welfare effects of trade in the recyclable




 PF dXFdPR PR dREdPR  RE PZ dZRdPR (25)
Again, the welfare effects of trade in the recyclable material break down
into the terms of trade effect, shown in the first term, and the recycling
effect shown by the second term in (25). The terms of trade improvement
through an increase in the export price of PR improves welfare by the
amount proportional to the volume of exports. The recycling effect in the
second term is negatively correlated with an improvement in the terms of
trade for Xˆ F
Pˆ R
 0. As PR increases, XF will fall and hence the the amount
of waste generated from the final good ZR decreases.６）
In contrast to the gains from trade in final goods, the terms of trade
effect and the recycling effect counteract. Depending on which effect
dominates, a country may or may not gain from trade in recyclable mate-
rial. If the terms of trade effect dominates, an increase in PR improves
welfare, while if the recycling effect dominates an increase in PR deterio-
rates welfare. There exists gains from trade in recyclable materials if the
terms of trade effect dominates.７）
In Figure 6, the effects of the changes in PR is decomposed to the
terms of trade effect, from A to A 0，and the recycling effect, from A 0to
A. Point A 0 is on the production possibility frontier associated with ZR0
and is tangent to the income line aaat (PFPR )1 . An increase in PR affects
６） The effects of the changes in PR on XF and ZR are discussed in Appendix.
７） If the recyclable material is imported instead, g0 dud PR  0; reduction in PR in-
creases welfare.
Gains from Trade in Recyclable Materials
― ―１０７
the volume of RE positively at a given level ZR0. An increase in RE , then,
induces a reduction in XF and hence ZR , which shifts the production pos-
sibility frontier down. The new equilibrium is at A where it is tangent to
a a . The recycling effect is indicated by the change from A 0 to A .
There are gains from trade in recyclable materials if the distance between
A to A 0 exceeds A 0 to A .
It became apparent that the relative size of the terms of trade effect
and the recycling effect is crucial in determining the welfare effects of the
trade in recyclable materials. In the following subsection, we compare
these results with the ones for trade in recyclable materials which are
instead produced by using consumption wastes.
3.3 Industrial Wastes v.s. Consumption Wastes
To examine welfare effects of trade in recyclable materials which are
made from consumption wastes, as opposed to production wastes, we need
to re-evaluate the recycling effects. Suppose the waste generation function
Figure 6: Gains from Trade in the Recyclable Materials Made with Production Wastes
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(3) is replaced by
ZF   CF (26)
It has been shown in Yamashige (2011) that Zˆ R
Pˆ R
 0 if the GDP share of
the recycling sector is sufficiently large.８）In case of consumption wastes,
the recycling effect is positive, i.e., as PR increases, ZR increases. The
terms of trade improvement increases income which enable consumers to
expand the consumption of the final good. With an increased consumption,
more waste is generated and increases the output of the recyclable mate-
rial.
The positive response of ZR is captured in Figure 7 below. As ZR
increases, the production possibility curve shifts up. and the equilibrium
point moves from A to A. In case of consumption wastes, the terms of






 0 if the output effect of ZR exceeds the substitution effect of aˆ RZ . See
Equation (28) and the discussion thereafter in Yamashige (2011).
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trade effect A to A 0 and the recycling effect A 0 to A reinforce one an-
other in reducing XF and expanding RE . Recall that in case of production
wastes, ZR responds negatively to the terms of trade improvement, and the
terms of trade effect and the recycling effect offset one another. Whether
there exist gains from trade in recyclable materials depends crucially on
how the wastes are generated.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper was intended to provide an answer to a very simple but an
important question on the gains from trade in recyclable materials. We
examined gains from trade in recyclable materials which are formalized as
traded intermediate goods made from industrial wastes. The welfare ef-
fects of trade in recyclable materials were decomposed to the two offset-
ting effects of the terms of trade effect and the recycling effect on welfare.
We were able to show that trade in recyclable materials brings about gains
from trade if the terms of trade effect exceeds the recycling effect, and
looses from trade if otherwise. The result was shown to be in contrast
with the trade in recyclable materials made from consumption goods.
Whether there exists gains from trade in recyclable materials depends on
how wastes are generated.
The effective recycling process relies heavily on the waste collection
system. Property rights of wastes, collection and landfill costs all depend
on how the recycling system is institutionally designed in the society.
Collecting and processing industrial wastes and consumption wastes in
separate recycling systems, in practice, causes some inefficiency in re-
source utilization. Hosoda (2008) raises some questions on the validity of
distinguishing the two types of wastes. However, as we have seen in this
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paper, industrial wastes and consumption wastes have economically differ-
ent welfare effects.
The result of this paper needs to be interpreted with some caution for
the model only captures the resource aspect of the recyclable material.
The cost of collection and sorting, and landfills were not considered in the
paper, but certainly important. Although the model is too crude to draw
any definite policy implication, we have seen some economic justification
for having individual recycling systems for industrial wastes and con-
sumption wastes.
5 Appendix
We will examine the effects of the changes in PR by using the figures
shown in section 2. As we have seen in Figure 2, an increase in PR alters
factor prices in such a way that  PZ and  PR both decrease. Therefore, more
labor intensive production techniques are applied in both the final good
sector and the recycling sector. (See Figure 8. and 9.)
As  PR decreases from (  PR )0 to (  PR )1，the slope of the iso-cost line gets
flatter in Figure 9. Consequently, R and XF both decrease. However, a
decrease in XF has an added effect of reducing the waste and hence the
production function for the recyclable material FR (LR ; ZR0) shifts down to
FR (LR ; ZR1) in Figure 8.
Note, however, that the amount of R and RE may or may not in-
crease. The supply curve of R may not be upward sloping. Mathematical
conditions for such cases are readily available from (19).
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Figure 8: Trading Equilibrium with Increased PR
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